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NOTES

1969]

the specific crime committed. Furthermore, requiring this procedure leaves
unanswered the question of what type of conduct justifies an increased sen-

tence." If the Court held as it did to avoid encroachment on the states'
police powers, it did not succeed. The unanswered practical and legal questions which arise from the decision" may involve the Court in a review of
virtually every case involving increased punishment on retrial and may impose the Court's penological theory on the courts of every state.
Ira D. Einsohn

Leary v. United States: Marijuana Tax Act

-

Self-Incrimination
Marijuana was found in the defendant's car as he attempted to re-enter
the United States from Mexico. He was convicted in federal district court
for failing to register and pay the transfer tax under the Marijuana Tax
Act.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed' and denied
the petition for rehearing.' The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' Held, reversed: The order form and transfer tax provisions of
the Marijuana Tax Act violate the privilege against self-incrimination as
they force the defendant either to violate their requirements or to classify
himself as a person inherently suspect of criminal activities. Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
I.

TAXATION: REGULATORY OR REVENUE MEASURE

Congress has often utilized a registration or transfer tax to regulate and
discourage undesirable or illegal activities.' One such regulatory measure
is the Marijuana Tax Act which requires that transferees pay a tax upon
all transfers of marijuana! and makes it unlawful to obtain marijuana
without paying the tax.7 The Act also requires that persons who can
legally deal in marijuana (physicians, researchers, etc.) register with the
48 Conviction of another crime since the original sentencing proceeding seems to be an acceptable
criterion for higher punishment on retrial. Jacques v. State, 53 N.J. 61, 247 A.2d 885 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 985 (1969).
49 Moon v. State, 250 Md. 468, 243 A.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1968), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 975
(1969), may begin to answer the questions. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and
sentenced to twelve years. His conviction was nullified because of a faulty indictment. On retrial
he was found guilty of armed robbery and also of larceny and assault with intent to commit murder. He was assessed twenty years for armed robbery and given suspended sentences for larceny and
assault with intenit to commit murder. The higher sentence was upheld on due process grounds.
Among the other questions to be argued will be the retroactivity of North Carolina v. Pearce.

126 U.S.C. §§ 4741(a) (2), 4744(a) (2) (1964).
'Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
'Leary v. United States, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1968).
" Leary v. United States, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
sAct of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209 (a tax upon oleomargarine colored to resemble
butter); Act. of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act); Act of
Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1200, 40 Stat. 1138 (Child Labor Tax Law); Act of June 26, 1934, ch.
757, 48 Stat. 1236 (National Firearms Act).
626 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964).
126 U.S.C. § 4744 (1964).
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Internal Revenue Service. Both registered and nonregistered transferees
are required to obtain an order form on the occasion of each transfer of

marijuana.
Challenges to the congressional power to regulate conduct through
taxation have met with little success. The United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly expressed a reluctance to question congressional power in
this area.' An example of the Court's approval of obviously discriminatory
tax measures was demonstrated by McCray v. United States." McCray

involved a federal tax on artificially colored oleomargarine, which was
attacked as being a violation of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution and an invasion of the police power reserved to the states.
The Court rejected this argument and stated that its powers did not
extend to avoiding a congressional exertion of the taxing power, regard-

less of whether the action was thought by the Court to be an oppressive
use of the delegated powers of Congress."
In a number of subsequent cases the Court followed basically the same
rationale in refusing to question the motives of Congress so long as the
tax measure produced revenue." The highwater mark of this line of cases
was reached in Nigro v. United States," in which the Court again rejected
the police power argument because a raise in the rate of the Anti-Narcotic
Act" made it purely a revenue measure.

It may be true that the provision of the Act . . . has the incidental effect
of making it more difficult for the drug to reach those who have a normal
and legitimate use for it . . . . But this effect . . . should not render the
order form provisions void as an infringement on the state police power where
these provisions are genuinely calculated to sustain the revenue features.'"
II.

TAXATION AND SELF-INCRIMINATION

As attempts to assert the police power argument failed, an argument
based upon self-incrimination was proffered. In United States v. Sullivan' s
the defendant was convicted of refusing to file an income tax return on
illegally obtained income. The Court rejected a fifth amendment argument and held that "[I]t would be an extreme if not an extravagant
application of the 5th Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in
crime."" The Court did not find it necessary to investigate the possibilities
of the tax information being used against the defendant in a subsequent
criminal prosecution.
'Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289
(1927); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86

(1919).
9195 U.S. 27 (1904).
'Id.
at 63-64.
" Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289
(1927); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
"2276 U.S. 332 (1928).
"34 This Act was the Revenue Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (1913-1915).
Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 353-54 (1928).
"274 U.S. 259 (1927).
'Id. at 263-64.
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The constitutionality of the Marijuana Tax Act was upheld in United
States v. Sanchez." However, Sanchez did not involve a criminal prosecution, and the fifth amendment question was not raised. The Government was seeking to recover taxes due under the Act in a civil suit.
Thus, the Court found that since liability for the tax does not depend on
criminal conduct, it is properly termed a civil rather than a criminal
sanction.
In United States v. Kahriger" the provisions of the Revenue Act of
1951 requiring registration of those engaged in the business of accepting
wagers were attacked as being violative of the fifth amendment. Noting
that the defendant's willful failure to register preceded the gambling,
the Court held that the self-incrimination privilege was inapplicable because the privilege "has relation only to past acts, not to future acts that
may or may not be committed."" This rationale was further developed
in Lewis v. United States.' There, the defendant was prosecuted for failure
to pay the wagering tax. The Court, in considering the self-incrimination
issue, again emphasized that the defendant was not required to disclose
information as to past acts and that payment of the registration fee must
be made before engaging in gambling. Thus, registration and payment
of the fee compelled no self-incrimination at the time of registration. The
Court held that the Act only forced the defendant to make a threshold
decision to either forego wagering or pay the tax; he may be forced to
give up gambling, but the Court pointed out that there is no constitutional
right to gamble." The latter argument was used by at least one district
court in upholding the Marijuana Tax Act.'
The Court abandoned this line of reasoning in 1968 and emphasized
the privilege against self-incrimination in three companion cases. Marchetti v. United States' held that a conviction for failure to pay an
occupational tax for engaging in the business of accepting wagers" violated
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Grosso v. United
States' extended Marchetti and held that the excise tax' itself imposed on
wagering was also unconstitutional. In Haynes v. United States" the
Court struck down the registration requirements for certain firearms and
the crime of possession of unregistered firearms.' All three decisions were
based on the self-incrimination argument, and Marchetti overruled
Kahriger and Lewis: "The central standard for the privilege's application
had been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination . . . . This
17 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
's345 U.S. 22 (1953).

"United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 32 (1953).
2"348 U.S. 419 (1955).
v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 425 (1955).
2"Lewis
2
Arrizon v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 26, 27 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
23390 U.S. 39 (1968).
2426 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412 (1964).
25390 U.S. 62 (1968).
2626 U.S.C. § 4401 (1964).
27390 U.S. 85 (1968).

1626 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5851 (1964).
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principle does not permit the rigid chronological distinction adopted in
Kabriger and Lewis."' 9 The Court emphasized the danger of the categorization of an individual as a participant in a wrongful activity as far
as his privilege against self-incrimination was concerned. "They are unmistakably persons 'inherently suspect of criminal activities . '..This meant
that the individuals who were required to register were forced to identify
themselves as criminals or as individuals likely to participate in criminal
activities. Thus, the registration requirements were self-incriminatory as
they provided a "link in a chain" of evidence which facilitated the categorization that could tend to establish guilt."' The Court no longer considered this protection from the position of an individual being allowed
to violate laws, but in relation to the choice of either violating a statutory
tax or exposing himself to self-incrimination."
Chief Justice Warren predicted ultimate blanket protection at the expense of federal regulation. In dissenting to Marchetti and Haynes, he
noted that special registrations of narcotics, marijuana, white phosphorous
matches, distilleries, and firearms, among others, were made vulnerable
to attack by these decisions."

II.

LEARY V. UNITED STATES

In Leary v. United States4 the United States Supreme Court followed
the reasoning of Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes and held the Marijuana
Tax Act to be unconstitutional." The requirements that an individual
register and pay a tax upon the transfers of marijuana were held to be
violations of the individual's right against self-incrimination.
The basic controversy in Leary centered upon the applicability of
Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes. The Government attempted to distinguish
the situation established by the Marijuana Tax Act from the measures
voided in these cases, and argued there was no real danger of self"Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
"Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96 (1968).
" Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968): "[H]e was required on pain of criminal
prosecution, to provide information which he might reasonably suppose would be available to
prosecuting authorities, and which would surely prove a significant 'link in a chain' of evidence
tending to establish his guilt."
"2id.
"'Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 83 (1968). See also id. at 84: "The implications of
the Court's decisions today also extend beyond the tax statutes. For example, the statute requiring
narcotics addicts and violators to register whenever they enter or leave the country, . . . can now
be expected to come under attack." For an application of the Marchetti reasoning to a state statute
requiring an automobile driver who is involved in an accident to furnish his identity and other
information to the other party, see Byers v. Justice Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Cal. 1969).
84 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
aSA lower court had earlier applied the principles to the same situation of possession of
marijuana. United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp. 886, 888-89 (S.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd, 395
U.S. 57 (1969):
A reading of the statutory tax scheme presently in question discloses that it, like
those previously declared 'unconstitutional,' raises more than merely imaginary hazards
of self-incrimination. The hazards here are likewise real, appreciable and substantial,
and the statutory requirements, with many exclusions, are primarily directed at those
who are inherently suspect of criminal activities. Again, as was the case of persons
who complied with the statutes challenged in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, those
who pay the tax imposed by § 4741 (a) are subject to having their names published
in a list made available to interested prosecuting authorities by virtue of S 6107.
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incrimination, as the Act was not aimed at the group protected by
Marchetti, but it taxed a non-criminal group-those who obtained and
used marijuana for legal purposes. The Government emphasized the congressional power to place preconditions on the sale or purchase of a regulated commodity. a" It was claimed that if the individual was not a member
of the non-criminal group, he could not obtain an order form. His registration form would be returned and no further action would be taken.
The Government argued on the basis of Sanchez that the individual had
a choice of either registering or abstaining. Thus the Act did not compel
self-incrimination. Ineligibility to pay a tax does not excuse an illegal
act. 7
The Court followed Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes to the extent claimed
by the defendant and predicted by Chief Justice Warren in his dissent to
Marchetti and Haynes and held that the Marijuana Tax Act did subject
an individual to a great risk of self-incrimination. The registration requirement gave notice that the registrant had a serious interest in obtaining

marijuana. The Court felt that such notice was sufficient to incriminate
the individual in a subsequent criminal prosecution.' The purpose of the
statute was the "bringing to light transgressions of the marijuana laws,"' "

and the defendant was required to identify himself as a member of a
t'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' ,
In holding that the rejected registration form could incriminate an
individual, the Court apparently is concerned with two possibilities of
self-incrimination. However, there seems to be nothing incriminating about
telling one he cannot legally do something, as is the case under the Marijuana Tax Act when registration is refused. The only option left for the
individual is to refrain or disobey the law. The criminal classification
theory seems to be the second possibility. The fact that an individual
has alerted a governmental agency that he desires to obtain marijuana is
self-incriminatory only because the agency would imply that he was
already a user, and be aware of him as a potential suspect. The only incriminating aspect of that implication would be if he were found with
marijuana he possessed before applying; anything obtained after his rejection would be his own choice. Thus, the Court seems to be relying
heavily upon the "inherently suspect" doctrine emphasized in Marchetti."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Leary v. United States seems to be significant as it cuts deeply into the
area of governmental regulation of individual conduct. Considered along
with Marchetti, Haynes, and Grosso, Leary may mean the federal restric"°United States v. Wong Sing, 260 U.S. 18, 21 (1922).
"'Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99 (1919).
"s Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969).
29
4 0 Id. at 27.
Id. at 18.
4' For lower court application of Leary see: Becton v. United States, 412 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.
1969); Miller v. United States, 412 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1969); Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d
1010 (8th Cir. 1969).

